Generally, the aircraftcouldbe recovered onlyby retracting theflapsandby thesheer strength of the pilotspulling back onthecontrol column. Although tailplane stallduetoicingcanoccur on anyclassof airplane, theproblem hashadthehighest rateof occurrence onthecommuter andlighttransport airplanes. Various reasons areoffered to explain this.
(1) Commuters operate tbr greater periods of time withinpotential ice zonealtitudes thando the large transports andtherefore havea greater likelihood of encountering icing. (2) Ice protection systems on commuters aretypicallyde-icers, whichmayleadto reduced airfoilperformance duetoresidual iceandice buildup between deicing cycles.
Previous research effortsto understand tailplane icing wereconducted by a Swedish-Soviet working group during the1970's to 1980's 234.Thefirstreport described an experimental studyof icing on the aerodynamics of high-lift, swept-wingsections. Experimental methods weredeveloped to estimate "critical" iceshapes, tosimulate icingconditions, andto fabricate ice"imitators". Thesecond andthirdreports focused ontailplane icinganditseffects onlongitudinal stability andcontrol. Windtunnel andflighttests were conducted tostudy thetaitplane stallphenomenon. This research effortprovided excellent insights intosome of theaspects oficecontaminated tailplane stall.
Theicingresearch program atNASALeRCalso studied thestability andcontrol changes dueto tailice ona DHC-6 TwinOtteraircraft 5.Results showed the longitudinal stabilitydecreased significantlywith artificial iceonthehorizontal tail,andthatthestability wasfurther decreased withtheflapsdeflected to 10°. Highthrust coefficient andlowaircraft-angle-of-attack were also significant contributors to the reduced stability. Inaddition, elevator control effectiveness was significantly reduced withtheartificial ice.
To promoteawareness of the tailplaneicing problem, theFederal AviationAdministration (FAA) sponsoredthree InternationalTailplane Icing Workshops in November 1991 ,April 1993 ,and September 1994 . These workshops generated approxi-mately30recommendations addressing issues on the icing environment, aerodynamics, ice detection and protection systems, flightoperations, andmaintenance. In response to someof theserecommendations, the FAA requested thatNASAconduct research intothe characteristics of ICTSandto develop techniques and methodologies to minimizethe hazard. A specific request wasmade to improve theunderstanding of the dynamic andaerodynamic characteristics of the socalledpushover andsideslip flightmaneuvers, andto develop a bodyof knowledge andtheorybehind the critical degradation oflongitudinal stability andcontrol caused bytailplane icing. NASAresponded totheFAA request bydeveloping theNASA/FAA Tailplane Icing Prograni (TIP).TheTIP wasco-sponsored by NASA LeRCand the FAA Technical Center through an
Interagency
Agreement. 
Ice Shape Selection
The second step was to develop ice shapes for testing.
Developing accurate ice shapes for this program was very important, so an IRT entry was scheduled.
Due to scheduler constraints at the IRT, testing was not possible in the early phasc of the program, so it was decided to perlbrm initial aeroperformance tests at OSU on two other ice shapes. The first ice shape was used in previous stability and control projects and was therefore labeled S&C Ice (Figure 4 ). The shape was determined using a method described in Reference 7, and the icing tlight conditions and photographs from one of NASA remaining on the tail between the pneumatic de-ice boot operation -Inter-cycle Ice ( Figure 6 ). Another shape represented the ice accretion during a failed de-ice boot condition -Failed Boot Ice (Figure 7) . The icing conditions used to form these ice shapes were the same with the exception of the time. These conditions were: A sample of the aero wind tunnel results lot one elevator deflection (te=0°) can be seen in Figure 10 - Figure   13 . All aeroperlormance coefficients (Ci, Cd, Cm and Cn¢) are affected by the ice contamination to some de_ee.
Ranking the ice shapes in terms of lift coefficient, the least affcctcd was the inter-cycle ice, lbllowed by the thiled boot ice, and ending with both the S&C and LEWICE ice shapes having :he most degradation in C_,_, and reduction in stalling angle of attack. The reductions in Cim_xand stalling angle of attack for each shape are listed in Table I . taws leading edge to record the flow field at the tailplane (Figure 14) . A pressure belt was wrapped around the stabilizer and elevator to allow calculation of the tailplane lift performance. A video camera was mounted below the tail to monitor and record tuft activity on the suction surface. and normal acceleration (N2). Data was recorded for all maneuvers listed in Table 2 . Figure  15 provides a graphical representation of a pushover to zero-G. The trim point recovery was similar to the pushover, but the nose-down push on the control column was limited to the column position where trim was established. Stall recovery maneuvers were initiated from a near-stall speed where a nose-down control column was implemented to recover from the stall. Wind-up turns were performed through steep-turns to reach 2-G normal acceleration.
Phase I Baseline Tests
The results from this initial effort were used directly in the IRT test and analytical c_e development, and provided critical information needed to proceed to the next phase of flight test with the ice shapes.
Phase 2 htter-cvcle Ice Tests
The second phase of flight tests was conducted on the Twin Otter between July and October 1997. After repeating selected baseline tests, the inter-cycle ice castings were mounted to the horizontal tail ( Figure 16 - NASA LeRC subscribes to the 10°flap limitation in routine icing operations and does not recommend exceeding the manufacturers stated limitations. Table 3 provides a summary of the maneuvers flown with the inter-cycle ice shape. 
Phase 2 Failed Boot Ice Tests
Alter fully testing the inter-cycle ice shape, the failed boot ice shape was mounted on the tailplane ( Figure  18 ) and flight tests proceeded to explore the boundaries of tail stall with this level of ice contamination. Maneuvers similar to the inter-cycle ice werc flown, and are listed in Table 4 caused the aircraft to pitch nose-down for 3-sec to 0 =-37°and lose 300 feet of altitude even though recovery procedures were employed within 1,4second of the stall. Alter this test point, the pushovers were limited to 8F=20°and elevator doublets were limited to a maximum _iF=3()".
Phase 2 S&C Ice Tests
The final ice shape tested was the S&C shape ( Figure 19 ). As the wind tunnel tests indicated, the aeroperformance characteristics for this ice shape were the worst and nearly identical to the LEWICE shape.
For thi_ reason the LEWlCE shape was not flight tested. Table 5 lists the details of this limited test matrix. The increase in ice shape severity (based on wind tunnel tests) reduced the stalling angle of attack (_i_) and C_, of tailplane, so that ICTS was encountered at premature test conditions (_iF, N_, _/_). As the flaps were deflected, the _it was made more negative due to an increase in wing downwash and a decrease in _ to maintair aircraft lift coefficient. As the speed increased, the oq_i_ was made more negative due to a decrease in _u_. Fir ally, as thrust was increased, a greater tail downloz:i was required to counteract the nose-down pitching moment because the thrust line was above the cg. For some configurations, the tail CI _m,.,_a may exceed tile Ci _.,il_J_ and result in a ICTS event.
Tac:ile cues that preceded the tail stall events were an inability or difficulty to trim, pitch excursions, onset of pilot :nduced oscillations, buffeting in the controlsnot the axframe.
When the full tail stall was experienced during the power transition, the stall recovery procedure was:
•
Reduce thrust (may be airplane specific )
• Pull backonyoke/ increase
• Raise flaps
Reducing thrust was the first part of the procedure because it was increasing thrust that led to the stall event that was encountered.
Pulling back on the yoke increased the camber of the tailplane, which provided enough tail download to counteract the nose-down pitching moment and increase the at,_il. Raising the flaps was initiated by the copilot immediately, but the flaps are hydraulically actuated and movement is rather slow (-l°/sec). The major lesson learned to recover from a tail stall was to undo what was just done to cause the event.
It was noted that this tail stall recovery procedure is opposite of the recovery from a wing stall. The reason for the difference is the location of the flow separation.
In a wing stall, the flow separates from the upper surface of the wing, therefore reattachment is made by decreasing the wing or. In a tail stall event, the flow separates from the lower surface of the tail and requires a positive increase in tail _to reattach the flow. Because of these differences in the stalling mechanisms and recovery procedures, it was determined that pilots should be made aware of the cues that may occur prior to a tailplane stall. Eftorts to increase pilot awareness on this topic are described in the following section. Pubic report ng burden or this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, inct iding the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources.
